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Abstract:  
Legitimacy is a key concept in political science. It has deep normative roots in democratic 
theory and refers usually to righteous, just, fair, and therefore acceptable rule. However, non-
democracies also try to create a following among their citizens. They also engage in justifying 
their rule through politicization, be it of religion, ethnicity, or ideologies ranging from left-
wing communism to right-wing nationalism. Against this backdrop, this essay poses the 
question: does it make sense to use the concept of legitimacy for both types of regimes, 
democracies and autocracies alike? Or, do we overstretch the concept when transplanting it to 
the non-democratic realm? And, empirically, how can we assess to what degree a non-
democracy is viewed as legitimate by its citizens? The essay aims therefore at (1) defining 
what legitimacy and legitimation is in autocratic settings; (2) drawing a semantic map of rival 
concepts like support, trust, and loyalty; and (3) tackling concrete challenges in measuring 
this elusive concept.  
 
Keywords: Legitimacy, Authoritarianism, Concept-Building 
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1. Legitimacy in an unlikely context? 
Is there something like legitimacy in autocracies1? Particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, 
this was a hotly debated question when scholars disagreed about the nature of Soviet-type 
regimes. While one camp argued that the communist regimes do indeed create legitimacy 
among its citizens, the other camp criticized these accounts for concept stretching and for 
neglecting the normative roots of the term legitimacy (e.g. Feher and Rigby, 1982; Pakulski 
1986). For critics, there was no such thing as legitimacy in autocracies, let alone in 
communist regimes.  
This debate is not an outdated debate among old-fashioned scholars and 
Kremlinologists. Instead, it is a timely endeavor that has not lost its relevance for political 
scientists and practitioners. Around the world, we currently observe a rise of autocratic 
leaders that claim to be legitimated by their people. Ranging from Vladimir Putin in today’s 
Russia, to the general secretaries of China’s one-party-rule, but also to political leaders like 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey and Viktor Orbán in Hungary that gradually slide into 
authoritarianism, all of them claim to be entitled to rule by their citizens.  
The question of whether there is something like legitimacy in autocracies has also 
resurfaced in academia. Today, we know more about the inner workings of non-democratic 
regimes. In recent years, social sciences observed a renaissance in the study of comparative 
authoritarianism (Geddes, 1999; Pepinsky, 2014). Key institutions have been analyzed: from 
political parties (Brownlee, 2007; Magaloni 2006; Smith, 2005), to elections (Schedler, 2013; 
Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009), from parliaments (Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski, 
2007) to informal power sharing arrangements (Svolik, 2009, 2012; Arriola, 2009; Magaloni, 
2008). These institutions are understood to be crucial for autocratic rule.   
 
1 There is a terminological debate about the differences between authoritarian and autocratic regimes. I perceive 
autocracy as the umbrella term that unites different forms of authoritarian, sultanistic, but also totalitarian 
regimes. As such, it is closest to mark the antipode to democracy.  
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Within this renaissance, a new strand of research has picked up the old legitimacy 
debate and asked whether autocratic regimes – besides using repressive techniques and co-
opting potential elites – do stabilize their rule by seeking the support of the people (Dukalskis 
and Gerschewski, 2017; Kailitz and Stockemer, 2015; Grauvogel and von Soest, 2014; 
Gerschewski, 2013; Holbig, 2013; Gilley, 2009). From a rational perspective, this would 
make sense for the autocratic regime: Repressing opposition is a costly endeavor – at least in 
the long run. Repression creates counterproductive incentives as it spikes protest. From the 
autocrat’s perspective, these unintended consequences need to be avoided (Davenport, 2007). 
These researchers argue therefore that autocratic regimes need to legitimate their rule in order 
to maintain stable over a longer time period. Unless the regimes are mere kleptocracies or 
sheer tyrannies, they need to furnish a persuasive raison d’etre.  
In this light, this conceptual essay analyzes the capacity of the concept “legitimacy” to 
travel to the non-democratic realm. It poses the following questions: Is legitimacy the proper 
concept for social scientists to describe that autocratic rulers seek the support of the people? 
Or, do we overstretch the concept (and even fall in the trap of autocratic leaders) when we 
apply it to non-democratic rule? In other words, is “legitimacy in autocracy” an oxymoron, a 
“wooden iron”, or does it refer to an essential and stabilizing feature of autocratic rule? And 
finally, if legitimacy is indeed the proper concept, how do we know it when we see it?  
The remainder of the essay is structured as follows. I will first argue how we can 
define such a concept for autocratic regimes. Based on this definitional discussion, I will draw 
a semantic map of neighboring concepts and discuss their respective strengths and 
weaknesses. I will then clarify where the differences between legitimacy in autocratic and 
democratic regimes lie. Lastly, the challenges posed by measurement will be exposed, 
followed by a brief conclusion. 
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2. Systematizing concept analysis: The Ogden-Richards triangle  
A good starting point for any kind of concept analysis is the Ogden-Richards triangle 
(Sartori, 1984, pp. 22-23; Gerring, 1999; Schedler, 2011). It displays a trilateral relationship 
between the given name of a concept, its meaning (intension), and its empirical referent 
(extension). Take the following intuitive example: A ‘table’ (name) has the minimal meaning 
of a raised levelness (intension) that refers e.g. to a range of empirically observable tables in a 
seminar room (extension). The relationship between these three corners of the triangle is not 
always as straight forward as in the above example. If we translate the basic linguistic triangle 
to the social science world, several challenges arise. Yet, a systematic diagnosis of a concept 
takes seriously the relationships between name, intension, and extension.  
Let us first consider the relationship between name and meaning. While according to 
the famous French linguist de Saussure the name is given arbitrarily and usually based on 
social convention, the relationship between the name and the intension can be plagued by 
conceptual ambiguity. A 1:1 relationship between a given term and its intension may have 
been desired since Aristotle’s classic works, but the majority of today’s linguists agree that 
language is much fuzzier. In particular, the polysemic nature of concepts (one word, many 
meanings) troubles the work of social scientists considerably. Concepts cannot be clearly 
distinguished from each other, but instead overlap and so leave room for multiple 
interpretations. Together with their neighboring concepts, concepts form “semantic fields” 
that can be mapped (Sartori, 1970; Freeden 1994). Moreover, the relationship between the 
name and the meaning of a concept can suffer from definitional shortcomings. In general, the 
definition must be as sharp and parsimonious as possible and the defining features should 
inhibit sufficient discriminatory power vis-à-vis other features. The set of defining features 
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should also be jointly exhaustive and should be established at the same level of abstraction. A 
further demand is that a definition should not include contradictory features.  
Secondly, when it comes to the delicate balance between the name and the empirical 
referent, the core question is how do we know it when we see it? How do we identify an 
empirically observable object as being subsumed under the term? Like identifying that the 
piece of furniture is a table, we similarly need to identify legitimacy and legitimation efforts 
as such when observing them in an empirical instance. This, of course, is not a trivial 
challenge.  
Lastly, the balance between intension and extension has found its way into the social 
sciences under the term “ladder of abstraction” (Sartori, 1970, pp. 1040–1046;  Goertz, 2009). 
The relationship between intension and extension is inverse; an increase in the intension leads 
to a decrease of extension. If one adds to the intension (e.g. color, number of legs, material) to 
“table”, the empirical counterparts of tables to which this new intension matches decreases. In 
other words, if a table is not only defined by raised levelness, but also by having four legs and 
being composed of wood, then the number of empirical referents falls. This basic insight 
requires an apt calibration in choosing not just the right conceptual components, but also an 
adequate number and range of them in order to avoid over-determination and vagueness. 
When conceptualizing legitimacy in autocracies, this will be an important caveat. 
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Figure 1: The Ogden-Richards Triangle 
 
 
Own Source. 
 
In the following section, I will discuss the fruitfulness of applying the concept of 
legitimacy to non-democratic settings by discussing the respective bilateral relationships 
between name, intension and extension.  
 
3. Name vs. intension: Defining legitimacy in autocratic settings 
The biggest challenge in the relationship between name and intension (meaning) lies 
in avoiding conceptual ambiguity. Ideally, concepts should be delineated from each other. A 
primary way to do so is to define the concept, i.e. in the literal sense to set its borders. Based 
on a definition of legitimacy, I will then draw a semantic map of its three most prominent, 
neighboring, and rival concepts: support, trust, and loyalty. 
 
‘Name‘ 
Intension 
(meaning) 
Extension 
(empirical 
referents) 
Challenge of proper 
definition (mutually 
exclusive, jointly exhaustive, 
no contradictory features) 
Challenge of conceptual vagueness (apt 
balance in ladder of abstraction) 
Challenge of conceptual 
ambiguity (topography of 
concepts, mapping of 
semantic fields)  
Challenge of identifying 
proper empirical referents  
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A Definition 
A first definitional route has been outlined above. Etymologically, legitimacy is 
“according to the law” (legi intimus) (Würtenberger, 1982). For centuries, the term has been 
used to distinguish tyrannical rule from right and just rule. Throughout its conceptual history 
it has been used to describe democratic polities. It carries a strong positive connotation. 
“Legitimate” is equated with being good and fair; it is understood as being just, and therefore 
acceptable.  
However, the term legitimacy has also non-normative roots. This line of its conceptual 
legacy goes back to the strictly empirical usage of legitimacy in Max Weber’s work. In 
general, Weber strived to free the term from empirical ballast by arguing that we should not 
focus on how a rule ought to be, but rather to account for how it is (Collins, 1986, pp. 155–
158). Weber argued in favor of an empirically observable “belief in legitimacy” (Weber, 
[1922] 1978, p. 213). That paved the way for a usage of the term beyond normative 
democratic theory. And indeed, if we take Weber’s three types of legitimate rule, the legal-
rational, the traditional, and the charismatic rule, two of the three have non-democratic roots. 
Only the legal-rational type of rule refers to the adherence to (mostly democratic) procedures.  
Legitimacy is a relational concept arising between the ruler and the ruled. Rule (or 
more generally domination) is classically defined as the “probability that certain specific 
commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given group of persons” (Weber, [1922] 
1978, p. 212). As such, Weber sees domination/rule as a subset of power. In a dyadic 
relationship between a superior A and an inferior B, the difference between power and rule 
lies in the attitude of B towards A. Power lets B do what A wants, irrespective of his/her 
attitude. In a rule relationship, B acknowledges the authority and sees the entitlement claim of 
A as being justifiable. B believes in the right of A to rule. The transmission belt between A 
and B is therefore one of command and obedience. It has its roots in the study of military 
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organizations. Its major value is discipline and discipline is habitually trained. Weber captures 
this transmission belt in the German original aptly as “Gehorsamspflicht”, i.e. the obligation 
to obey (Weber, [1922] 2005, p. 129).  
In an influential critique, Beetham has argued that Weber’s legitimate rule typology is 
severely flawed. For him, it collapses several dimensions into one. Beetham disentangled the 
implicit dimensions and argued that we should make the multi-dimensionality of the concept 
explicit. For him, three criteria need to be assessed individually: legality, justifiability, and the 
concrete expression of consent (Beetham, 1991). These three criteria, although developed in 
reference to democratic polities, can be made fruitful for the study of non-democratic polities 
as well.  
Beetham argued that power needs to be “acquired and exercised in accordance to the 
established rules” (Beetham, 1991, p. 16). By so doing, it is oriented towards the Weberian 
ideal type of legal-rational rule and the etymological legalistic origin of the term. This poses 
difficulties in translation to non-democratic contexts. Legality usually goes hand-in-hand with 
democratic rule. Yet, if we follow a narrower understanding, i.e. of “settled expectations” in 
order to ensure predictability (Beetham, 1991, p. 65), then the route to applying legitimacy to 
autocracies becomes easier to travel. The argument is that only if norms have settled, their 
effects unfold. Although Beetham has not explicitly argued this way, I understand his first 
criterion as a necessary condition for legitimacy. Only when the established rules are settled, 
can legitimacy be achieved. As such, it is a prerequisite for legitimacy. Only if people accept 
the established rules through Weberian habituation over time, does this establish the necessary 
condition for a legitimacy belief by the people. Irrespective of their political content, 
expectations need to be stable in order to be effective. In this sense, this first criterion can be 
translated to the realm of legitimacy in an autocratic context.  
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Secondly, existing norms need to be justified. They do not acquire full force if they 
remain in a legal sphere. Instead, rulers need to offer a justification of why the rulers are 
entitled to rule. Rulers need to credibly anchor their legitimacy claim in the hearts and minds 
of the people. Anchor points can be diverse. On the one hand historical narratives can be used 
to differentiate from former rule (e.g. anti-colonial struggle, civil war). On the other hand, 
narratives can be built that create a religious, ethnic, or ideological unity. Yet, it should be 
noted that this justifiability should not be restricted only to the ruled. But: the ruler need what 
Barker has called “endogenous or self-legitimation” (Barker, 2001, pp. 30–40). Governments 
must also demonstrate to themselves that they are entitled to rule. It is characteristic to all 
kinds of governments “just as worship is one of the characterizing activities of religion” 
(Barker, 2001, p. 30).   
The third criterion refers to the explicit transmission of legitimacy. This can take the 
form of swearing an oath, of going to the polls, or of organizing a mass rally. There is a 
variety of legitimating transmission forms. What is important is that there is any action that 
“confers legitimacy on the powerful” (Beetham, 1991, p. 91, italics in original). We know that 
for example communist regimes have been particularly successful in manufacturing a 
legitimacy transfer by making use of rallies, organizations, and holding (symbolic) elections. 
However, also non-communist regimes engage regularly into (semi- and non-competitive) 
elections and other events that serve as a transmission belt for acquiring legitimacy.  
With these refinements in mind, we can make use of the concepts of legitimacy and 
legitimation even beyond the democratic realm. We can define it in the following way: 
Legitimacy is a relational concept between the ruler and the ruled in which the ruled sees the 
entitlement claims of the ruler as being justified, and follows them based on a perceived 
obligation to obey. The legitimating norms must constitute settled expectations in order to be 
fully effective and must be actively transferred. The extent of legitimacy can so be defined as 
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the strength (how deep?) and width (how many?) of the relational bond between the ruler and 
the ruled.  
A last word on the difference between legitimacy and legitimation is in place here. I concur 
with Barker and other scholars that legitimacy is an ascribed attribute and a property of an 
object (e.g. a regime), while legitimation refers to the process of gaining legitimacy. While 
the former is a property, the latter is an action. While the former can be normatively 
grounded, the latter refers to an empirically observable activity (Barker, 2001, pp. 22–25). It 
might therefore be in general less “demanding” to talk of legitimation in autocracies 
(understood as the attempt of the ruler to gain a following) than of legitimacy in autocracies. 
While most scholars would agree that even autocrats spend time and effort in justifying their 
rule – whether via propagandistic media channels, political education programs, performance, 
or even the hosting of prestigious international sport events and spectacles –, democratic 
theorists might be tempted to refute the very idea of legitimacy being applicable to non-
democratic settings. Due to the term’s rich historical lineage and the deep interweavement 
between legitimacy and a just and fair democratic polity in the history of Western political 
thought, this refutation takes place on solid ground (Würtenberger, 1982). Non-democratic 
settings entail coercive environments that make invocation of legitimacy inappropriate. For 
this sceptic view, legitimate authoritarianism remains necessarily a “wooden iron”; it is an 
oxymoron.  
 
Neighboring terms of support, trust, and loyalty 
In order to identify the core differences and similarities of neighboring concepts, it is a 
fruitful endeavor to draw a semantic map. Neighboring concepts that capture the phenomenon 
that all political regimes try to create a following among its ruled population are support, trust, 
and loyalty. These rival concepts will be delineated from the concept of legitimacy.  
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Support is the most neutral and most encompassing term that can be used. Scholars 
have been more comfortable using this concept in non-democratic contexts (Geddes and 
Zaller, 1989). It does not contain the normative ballast of legitimacy. The concept of support 
is therefore more rooted in the empirical, sociological tradition than in normative democratic 
theory. As it stems from systems theory, it also allows an application to all types of political 
systems. David Easton’s long shadow on today’s political science is still tangible. 50 years 
ago, he defined political support as follows: “We can say that A supports B either when A 
acts on behalf of B or when he orients himself favorably toward B” (Easton, 1965, p. 159). In 
this sense, Easton placed emphasis on both the action and the attitude. Easton distinguished 
between two modi of support. Diffuse support is long-term oriented and represents “a 
reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs 
to which they are opposed” (Easton, 1965, p. 273). Specific support, in turn, is more short-
term oriented. Scharpf’s output legitimacy that is rather “interest based than identity based” 
(Scharpf, 1999, p. 12) comes close to Easton’s specific support. With this in mind, I would 
suggest the following for delineating support from legitimacy.2 While one can support a 
regime for different reasons, be it either out of ideational conviction or only out of utilitarian 
cost-benefit calculations, legitimacy necessarily refers to favorable attitudes towards the ruler. 
In this sense, Easton’s diffuse and specific support is more encompassing than legitimacy.  
If we cross-tabulate attitude and behavior and use the rather coarse-grained values of 
“pro-regime”, “anti-regime”, and “indifferent”, then the following matrix can be constructed. 
It demonstrates both the overlap and the difference between the two concepts. I have added in 
the fourth column a possible description for how we could name these actors.  
 
2 For Easton, legitimacy refers only the diffuse support towards the political regime and the authorities. The 
same holds true for trust that is gained via experience (whereas legitimacy is gained via socialization) and that 
refers also only to the modus of diffuse support for the regime or the authorities. For a discussion, please see the 
helpful overview by Fuchs and Klingemann (2009).  
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Table 1: Belief vs Behavior  
 
Type Belief Behavior Name for Actors Legitimacy  Support 
1 Pro-regime  Pro-regime True believers, 
convinced 
supporters 
yes yes 
2 Pro-regime Anti-regime Strategic coup 
plotters 
3 Pro-regime Indifferent Unmobilized 
supporters of 
regime 
4 Indifferent Pro-regime Conformist and 
apathetic followers, 
careerists 
5 Anti-regime Pro-regime Opportunists (As-
if-action) 
no  yes 
6 Anti-regime Indifferent Unmobilized and 
repressed 
opposition 
no no 
7 Indifferent Anti-regime Mobilized by 
opposition 
8 Anti-regime Anti-regime Activist, true 
opposition 
 
Own Source. 
 
I suggest that in order to apply the concept of legitimacy, the belief of the people must 
be necessarily either pro-regime or at least politically indifferent. I read Easton’s definition of 
support (“A supports B either when A acts on behalf of B or when he orients himself 
favorably toward B” (Easton, 1965, p. 159)) as being connected with a logical “OR”. 
Therefore, either the belief or the action must be present. 
With this in mind, I propose that the overlap between the two concepts occurs from 
type 1 agents (true believers) through type 3 agents (unmobilized supporters). They all hold a 
pro-regime belief regardless of their behavior. Holding political indifferent beliefs while 
displaying pro-regime behavior, type 4 agents might be perceived as controversial. They are 
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either conformists, careerists, or just apathetic followers. For the distinction between support 
and legitimacy, this is a borderline case. A strict application of legitimacy as being in favor of 
the regime would exclude these people. Being indifferent is not necessarily believing; 
therefore, this group would not fall in the legitimacy camp. A looser understanding of 
political indifference, however, would include this group. While it is clear that these type 4 
agents support the regime with their behavior (and so stabilize it), they are the undetermined, 
wavering group of people. On the mass level, they are apathetic and conformist. On the elite 
level, they would pursue a (political) career – irrespective of the regime form. As these groups 
ultimately decide to act in favor of the regime, I tend to classify them inside and not outside 
the legitimacy rubric.  
Type 2 agents also need some more elaboration. They have in general a pro-regime 
attitude, but undermine the regime stability with anti-regime behavior. Usually, this group 
tends to be rather small. They follow a strategical plan to come to power themselves by 
plotting a coup against what Svolik described as the “ruling coalition” (Svolik, 2012). 
However, they share the same favorable general attitudes towards the regime and view it as 
the appropriate form of government. Type 5 actors (opportunists) mark an important 
difference. They are characterized by an anti-regime attitude and a pro-regime behavior. 
Against this backdrop, this group can be delineated from type 4 agents. They are opportunists 
and not conformist. They act “as if” they were in favor of the regime, but they are not. Lisa 
Wedeen’s important ethnographic study on Syria of Hafiz al-Asad is one of the accounts in 
which this “as if action” is portrayed. Surrounded by an immense personality cult, Syrians 
acted as if they revered to the leader – which, in turn, installed a subtle and habitualized 
obedience into their hearts and minds (Wedeen, 1999). This group of people, whose size vary 
over different regimes, supports the regime without viewing it as legitimate.  
14 
 
The distinction between support and legitimacy can be traced back to the different 
motivations why a person supports a regime. A person who holds anti-regime beliefs but act 
as if s/he were in favor of it follows a utilitarian motivation based on cost-benefit calculus. 
S/he does not support the regime because s/he views it as being entitled to rule, but rather out 
of strategic considerations and out of the sheer fear of repression. Of course, social science 
scholars should abstain from holier-than-thou attitude and eschew moral judgements of this 
group. These actors keep quiet as they know that acting according to their beliefs will pose an 
often existential threat to them. What can be stated is that type 4 agents (conformists) 
constitute a borderline case in which the regime might be viewed as legitimate, while type 5 
agents clearly do not do so.  
Type 6 through type 8 agents describe different facets of the opposition. Type 8 is the 
mirror image of type 1 agents. It is the group of people that form the true and active 
opposition that view the regime as being illegitimate and act accordingly. Type 6 and type 7 
agents are then groups that are either repressed and remain therefore passive or represent the 
wavering group that can be mobilized by the opposition. What is important to note is that 
when cross-tabulating attitude and behavior, we can identify a considerable overlap between 
legitimacy and support. However, the difference lies in the group of as-if-actors that mark the 
difference in the conceptual scope.  
A second neighboring and rival concept is political trust. Easton’s diffuse and specific 
support had a lasting influence on this concept as well (Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995; Norris, 
1999). In survey research, a battery of questions is usually asked. Survey items like trust in 
the government, the party, the parliament, the military, or the police, etc. are widespread. In 
this light, Levi and Stoker have summarized “a minimal consensus”. For them, trust is – like 
legitimacy – relational. It involves an “individual making herself vulnerable to another 
individual, group, or institution that has the capacity to do her harm and to betray her” (Levi 
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and Stoker, 2000, p. 476). In a similar vein, Kaase has defined trust as both asymmetrical and 
relational (Kaase, 1999, pp. 2–3). There is one dominant A (government) who is trusted by a 
subordinate B (citizen). B trusts that A acts in B’s interest. However, B cannot be sure about 
A’s real intentions. Therefore, trust can be understood as “encapsulated interest” (Hardin, 
1999, p. 24). Trustworthy is then someone who credibly acts in the interest of the truster – and 
who has the actual competence to do so (Levi and Stoker, 2000, p. 476). Trust is therefore 
instrumental and evaluates the performance and effectiveness of the trustee.  
With this in mind, the semantic overlap between legitimacy and trust lies in its 
relational character between a dominant A and a subordinate B. Both relationships are 
asymmetric, between the trustee and the trusted and between the ruler and the ruled. However, 
there is nuance in the trust concept that refers to the competence of the trustee to fulfill the 
interest of the truster. Trust as encapsulated interest speaks more to a performative side of 
legitimacy while tending to neglect the ideational side. It can therefore be seen as a subset of 
legitimacy. Trust is also a subset of legitimacy in a second instance. Trust tends to refer to 
more concrete institutions like government, party, or parliament. It is rarely invoked in 
reference to the broader community and the identity of a nation. This is the realm of 
legitimacy. At least in the Weberian understanding of legitimate rule, legitimacy seems to be 
the more adequate term to characterize political rule and regimes as a whole.  
Lastly, loyalty is also defined here as a partial subset of legitimacy. I argue that loyalty 
differs from legitimacy in important ways. A narrow definition of loyalty refers to an 
emotional, deeply affective and non-rational attachment to a group (Shklar 1993, p. 184). 
Loyalty “adds a layer of faithfulness and utmost reliability” (Freeden, 2009, p. 195). In most 
accounts, loyalty is an inter-human relationship that is asymmetrical, often hinting 
“subservience and inequality” (Freeden, 2009, p. 198) of the subordinate B vis-à-vis the 
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dominant A.  In contrast, legitimacy, support, and trust are less imbued with this non-rational 
faithfulness.  
Loyalty is also rather reactive. Consider the canonical book by Hirschman (1970) on 
“Exit, voice, and loyalty”. He understood these options as “responses to a decline in firms, 
organizations, and states”. In a deteriorating situation, the two basic responses are either to 
leave or to voice discontent. The function of loyalty is then twofold: it “holds exit at bay and 
activates voice” (Hirschman, 1970, p. 78). As such, loyalty acts as a crisis catalyst (also: 
Hirschman, 1993). Loyalty can be observed most clearly in a direct reaction to a crisis 
situation. When being challenged, loyalty becomes more obvious.  
Yet, there is a general danger of confusing the observability of a phenomenon with its 
definition. To some extent, trust works the same way as loyalty. When being challenged, trust 
becomes easier to observe. A given challenge can be the litmus test by which scholars can 
decide if B trusts A or not. Yet, being challenged is not part of the definition of trust. Citizen 
B can trust her government A, regardless of whether it ever faced difficulties. Loyalty with its 
connotation of faithfulness, commitment, and emotional bonding strongly incorporates the 
idea that it is a crisis reaction. I follow here Gert (2013, p. 4) who argued that loyalty 
“requires an individual to be willing to make significant personal sacrifice”. Despite 
problems, troubles, and challenges, subordinate B remains loyal to dominant A and accepts 
personal costs. Loyalty inherently implies a concessive conjunction. I argue that loyalty 
follows the slogan: Right or wrong, my country/ my king/ my boss/ my family, etc. Ups and 
downs are almost necessary to speak about loyalty. At least a case could be made that loyalty 
is not only seen most clearly in times of crisis, but that a challenge of any sort is a prerequisite 
for even using the concept. As such, loyalty is a robust and stretchable bond, but might tend to 
be less durable and persistent.  
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One does not need to follow this line of argument to the end, but what is important to 
note is the following: Even if I view an action, a decision, or a regime as bad, wrong, false, or 
illegitimate, I can remain loyal. Legitimacy, instead, would require that I view the action as 
being justified. This is why loyalty is a partial subset of legitimacy. The sets can overlap when 
an actor is loyal to a regime that s/he views as legitimate, but the actor can also remain loyal 
even if s/he views the regime as illegitimate. Loyalty can also be delineated from legitimacy 
with regard to the addressee. While legitimacy refers to the population in general, loyalty 
tends to refers to a smaller circle of people. Loyalty is usually elite-centered. This has to do 
with potential future gains that motivate loyal behavior. The cooptation literature in 
comparative authoritarianism highlights this point. Notably, this strand of literature 
understands loyalty in a political economy perspective. For them, loyalty is not based on deep 
affection, but rather on rational cost-benefit calculus. The argument is straightforward: cronies 
remain loyal and do not revolt against the regime as they long as they can be bought off via 
policy concessions, material spoils, or other revenues – or at least as long as the assurance that 
they benefit from the current regime is credible (Gandhi 2008; Magaloni, 2008; Svolik 2009). 
Facing hard budget constraints, loyalty needs to be focused on key persons and can only be in 
rare circumstances dispersed to the masses.  
If we stick to the original definition of loyalty and maintain that a group remains loyal 
out of deep conviction, then the size of this group is usually also restricted. This group is then 
populated only with the type 1 actors described above. These are the true believers and it is 
empirically very rare that a society is composed only of true believers. Even North Koreans, 
as currently the most homogenous and the by far most indoctrinated society today, is viewed 
in newer research as much more fragmented than common images of the country might depict 
(e.g. Haggard and Noland, 2011). Loyalty tends to be more of an elite, rather than a mass, 
phenomenon.  
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Loyalty is therefore a partial subset of legitimacy. It has a stronger connotation of an 
affective, even non-rational faithfulness. It works as a catalyst that postpones exit and 
strengthens voice. It is reactive in a sense that despite problems, despite viewing an action or 
a regime as wrong or illegitimate, actors can remain loyal. Lastly, loyalty is usually restricted 
to a smaller group of people and is elite-centered. 
Figure 2: Semantic Map 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Own source. 
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in the middle between support on the one hand and trust and loyalty on the other hand. The 
concepts are therefore different in scope. They can embrace actors that both support the ruler, 
view him/her as legitimate, trust him/her, and remain loyal even in contested times. However, 
the Venn diagram in Figure 2 shows also that this is not necessarily the case. Actors can be 
loyal and supportive despite viewing the regime as illegitimate.  
 
4. Extension vs. intension: Finding a balance in the ladder of abstraction  
The relationship between extension and intension, i.e. between empirical referents in 
the outside world and semantic meanings of a term, has been popularized in the social science 
by Giovanni Sartori. Using the “ladder of abstraction” (sometimes also “ladder of generality”) 
(Sartori, 1970, pp. 1040–1046; Goertz, 2009) scholars attempt to find a balance between 
defining features on the one hand and empirical referents on the other. The relationship is 
inverse. Increasing intension leads to a decreasing of  extension and vice versa. This basic 
insight demands therefore from social scientists an apt calibration in not only choosing the 
right features, but also thinking carefully about an apt number and range of conceptual 
components. In this sense, I use the ladder of abstraction as a definitional tool that helps in 
distinguishing minimalist from maximalist understandings of legitimacy.  
Legitimacy incorporates various defining features – depending on “which satisfy the 
criteria laid open by the observer” (Barker, 2001, p. 9). Weatherford has so for example 
summarized them in four points that appear across a large body of literature: (1) 
accountability, (2) efficiency, (3) procedural fairness, and (4) distributive fairness 
(Weatherford, 1992, p. 150). Levi and colleagues would argue that the most important 
elements for a “value-based legitimacy” are (1) the trustworthiness of the government (that in 
turn depends on the performance, the leadership motivations and the administrative 
competence) and (2) procedural justice (Levi, Sacks and Tyler, 2009). Gilley has also grouped 
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a long list of suitable indicators into five “schools”: (1) the particularistic, (2) the sociological, 
(3) the developmental, (4) the democratic, and (5) the bureaucratic (Gilley, 2009, pp. 31–57). 
While the particularistic school highlights the time and context sensitivity of the concept that 
makes generalizations difficult, the other four are more substantial. The sociological school 
underlines social and cultural conditions that create a feeling of belonging; the developmental 
school is preoccupied with the evaluation of allocation and distribution of goods; the 
democratic school is concerned with just and fair procedures; and, finally, the bureaucratic 
school refers to the strength and effectiveness of state institutions. The expansiveness of these 
lists might suffice to drive home the point. There exists a magnitude of defining features for 
when we can speak of legitimacy of political regimes. On an even more basic level, one might 
be tempted to include free choice and voluntary consent into such a definition in the first 
place.  
The ladder of abstraction assumes in general that the defining elements stand in a 
necessary and sufficient condition structure (Goertz, 2006, p. 27-68). I follow this assumption 
here and argue that that the defining elements of the list stand therefore in a hierarchy. Going 
up the ladder one step therefore means adding a defining feature. If we use a maximalist 
conception of legitimacy and include all definitional features, the empirical referent side 
containing concrete autocratic regimes will be (almost) empty. If we apply minimalist 
conception, then the empirical referent box will therefore be more populated.3 Consequently, 
to apply the concept of legitimacy and legitimation in non-democratic contexts means to 
curtail its semantic range at a lower level. Only sociological, developmental, and bureaucratic 
conceptions of legitimacy can be used to identify empirical non-democratic referents. 
 
3 If we were to favor a family resemblance structure, the relationship could be the reverse. An increase in the 
defining feature would then not lead to a decrease of the empirical referents, but could rather lead to an increase 
in extension (Goertz, 2006, pp.40-44 and 69-94). A second basic concern of the ladder of abstraction could refer 
to the hierarchical order of the list that I propose here. The order should be seen as a suggestion and can be re-
arranged. Yet, the important idea here is that we should distinguish between “thick” and “thin”, i.e. between 
maximalist and minimalist definitions.   
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However, procedural features are increasingly gaining importance with the global spread of 
“electoral” (Schedler, 2006) and “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way, 2010).  
 
Figure 3: Ladder of abstraction for the concept of legitimacy  
 
 
Source: Own source 
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the empirical-analytical tradition – only refers to the phenomenon that nolens volens some 
people in autocratic regimes do believe that their rulers are entitled to rule to some extent.  
What we can learn from the list of definitional features, however, is that there are 
domains that remain reserved for democratic polities. While autocracies can refer to a basic 
sense of belonging in underlining nationalist argumentation patterns or can even exceed 
democracies with regard to bureaucratic capacities, efficiency, and economic growth, they are 
mostly blank when it comes to “deeper” values of political rule like fairness, consent, and the 
respect for human rights. Here, autocracies are often mute or evasive. When autocracies need 
to justify their right to rule, i.e. a kind of second-order justification, they need to curtail the 
discourse at a certain level in order to succeed. A hypothesis for future research could be 
generated here: the more an autocratic regimes climbs up the list of defining features in 
justifying its right to rule, the less it says about fundamental values. While its speeches, news, 
and texts are full of reference to nationalism or religion as a source of belonging and praise 
for economic efficiency and well-being, clear indications for procedural and consensual 
values remain sparse – if mentioned at all.  
 
5. Name vs. extension: How do we know it when we see it?  
In general, the naming of a phenomenon – with some rare exceptions like 
onomatopoeia – is arbitrary and does not follow a certain motivation. For the purpose of this 
essay, I extend the mere linguistic relationship between name and extension to the methodical 
challenge of identifying proper empirical referents. We attach the name “table” to any object 
with a raised levelness that we observe in a class room. This is an easy endeavor. However, 
how should we name what we observe, let’s say in today’s rural Russia? Do people there view 
Putin’s rule as “legitimate”? And what are the instruments out of our social science methods 
toolbox to identify this belief as legitimacy? When can we use the name “legitimacy” for an 
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empirical phenomenon that we observe? Or, more bluntly: how do we know it when we see 
it?  
Of course, the methodological challenge of applying the concept of legitimacy to 
empirical reality does not apply to autocratic regimes solely. The most powerful criticism of 
the concept is that it is difficult to empirically observe. This line of critique argues that 
legitimacy is a property that is only observable when it is gone, or at least when it is in 
decline. Only if legitimacy is gone or in sharp decline, does it have some influence on 
observable variables, such as stability. It is a dilemma that – in the eyes of the critics – is 
unsolvable (Marquez, 2015; O'Kane, 1993). Przeworski has led the group of critics to a 
second and related argument. For him, the entire concept of legitimacy should be dismissed 
when explaining macro-phenomena like stability, on the ground that as “isolated individuals 
do not shake political orders”. Przeworski argues that if legitimacy is understood in an 
individualist sense (as done in this essay), it has only “little bearing on the issue of stability” 
(Przeworski, 1991, p. 28), because only organized interests matter. So, while one faction of 
critics insist that we can only see legitimacy in decline as it then triggers observable 
phenomena like stability, a second declares that it lacks even this influence. These are the 
severe challenges on the democratic side; the challenges on the autocratic side of the regime 
spectrum are even more difficult (von Haldenwang, 2017). 
There are two routes by which we can attempt to measure legitimacy: survey research 
and behavioral indicators. Survey research constitutes in general the gold standard in knowing 
what people actually believe. However, this is very challenging in autocratic settings. Social 
scientists face a doubly troubling situation. On the one hand, some questions are too 
politically sensitive to be asked. (Self-)Censorship prevents us from knowing what people 
actually believe. On the other hand, the respondents face an incentive structure in which they 
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rather answer what is socially desirable and less risky for their own physical integrity. As a 
result, preference falsification is widespread (Kuran, 1991, 1997).   
Nevertheless, I would like to encourage survey researchers to think more thoroughly 
of legitimacy questions. Recently, the 6th wave of the European Social Survey has pioneered 
this type of research. They have explicitly included a battery of detailed questions that 
measures the legitimacy dimension (Weßels 2016). It has been designed with a view on 
democracies. However, what we could learn for the autocratic pole is their construction. They 
argue that we need a distinction between what people think how democracy should look and 
how it actually is. Following this line of research, I would propose a third dimension besides 
expectation (how it should be) and evaluation (how it is). For autocracies, we should also aim 
to include questions on the official legitimacy claim of the regime.  
This would leave us in future research with a double yardstick. On the one hand, an 
open question should inquire what characterizes a good political order in the eyes of the 
respondents. This question could be a functional equivalent for the questions what democracy 
means to you. It refers to the expectations of the citizens. On the other hand, survey questions 
should inquire the official legitimacy claims of the regime. These questions need to uncover 
how often a government refers to certain justification, how much emphasis the government 
places on it and if we can observe subtle shifts over time (see e.g. for the Polish case Bernhard 
1993, pp. 24-45). The obvious challenge for social scientists lies in compiling a list of 
possible legitimacy claims in autocratic settings.4 The list should be exhaustive, but does not 
need to be mutually exclusive as legitimacy formulae are often a mélange of different 
elements.    
 
4 Such a list could comprise for the ideational dimension in nationalism, tradition, charisma, religion, ethnicity, 
historical narrative (e.g. civil war, anti-colonial struggle, independence movement), political ideology, 
international frontlines. For the performance dimensions the list could include law and order, economic 
performance, social welfare.  
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These two yardsticks would inform us a) how the rule should be from the perspective 
of the ruled and b) how the rulers officially justify their rule. In a second step, these 
dimensions should be confronted with the evaluation of the respondents: a) to what extent are 
your expectations fulfilled? And, b) to what extent do the beliefs of the people (e.g. in your 
family/ your neighborhood/ your workplace) meet the claims of the regime? It goes without 
saying that these questions are politically sensitive and a neutral way of formulating must be 
found. They will suffer from preference falsification (Kuran, 1991, 1997). Yet, what I 
tentatively propose here is push the debate forwards. The most promising route seems to me 
to follow a triangular structure (expectation, claim, belief) and argue that only if these 
dimensions converge, we can assume that an autocratic regime is viewed as legitimate.  
Survey research is difficult and often just impossible in autocratic settings. In-depth, 
qualitative fieldwork is then the only route that uncovers the complexity of autocratic 
legitimacy. Expert surveys by which country experts judge to what extent they think what the 
people think can be a complementary source of information (Grauvogel and von Soest, 2014). 
Such surveys pool the expertise of case-specific knowledge and try to combine the best of two 
worlds: the qualitative case knowledge by assuring the comparability across cases. Yet, it 
should be clear that expert surveys on legitimacy in autocracies can only express the 
(expert’s) evaluation of the (people’s) evaluation. When it comes to the official legitimacy 
claims of the regime, these can be distilled by using qualitative and quantitative text analyses 
of representative texts. Speeches, official newspapers, or even textbooks in school curricula 
(Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2017) are innovative ways of approaching the question how these 
regime justify that they are entitled to rule. The alternative to survey research is a 
measurement via observable phenomena. Research on democracies has established tax 
compliance as an apt behavioral indicator for measuring legitimacy. The higher the share of 
people is that comply with tax rules, the more a regime is viewed as legitimate by the people 
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(Levi, Sacks, and Tyler, 2009). In earlier work, Levi has also studied voluntary military 
service as an adequate indicator (Levi, 1997). The selection of a suitable indicator for the 
autocratic pole must be driven by similar concerns: Do we find an empirically observable 
behavior that is not caused by repression, but, instead, demonstrates by and large a voluntary 
act that is motivated by perceiving the current rule arrangement as being justified.  
The most intuitive datum in this regard is mobilized political protest. The argument is 
straight forward: if people protest, they show their dissatisfaction with the ruler. However, 
protest cannot be equated with non-legitimacy. Not all protest is protest against the 
incumbents. We need to inquire more in depth who protests and why these people protest? 
This brings again survey research into play. The recent Arab uprisings have shown that social 
scientists attempted to collect this information about protesters’ motivations (Beissinger, 
Jamal and Mazur, 2015; Thyen and Gerschewski, 2017). Going beyond the size and 
frequency of protest and inquire into the motivations is a necessary step to use protest as a 
valid indicator for legitimacy. However, there are two further methodical caveats. Firstly, we 
tend to focus one-sidedly on successful cases of protest and overlook negative cases. Non-
protest also cannot be equated with legitimacy. Secondly, we tend to overestimate the effect 
of declining legitimacy if we do not control for the effect of repression. Roughly speaking, 
protest emerges out of a conjunction of declining legitimacy and declining repression. When a 
window of opportunity opens by less repression, protest becomes just more probable. If we 
take protest as a mere indicator for declining legitimacy, we fail to account for this basic 
relationship between repression and protest possibility.  
A promising alternative behavioral indicator has recently been brought forward by 
Dimitrov (2014). He finds that in communist regimes people submitted official citizen 
complaints. These complaints were targeted at material issues (housing car, etc.), but also 
raised political issues. Not unlike compliance with taxation, the magnitude and content of 
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citizen complaints can tell us something about the extent to which the ruled see the rulers as 
legitimate. In a similar vein, the responsiveness debate has sparked scholarly interest for the 
cases of Vietnam and China. Based on novel data, it has been shown that responsiveness and 
legitimacy plays an important role in the resilience of these autocratic regimes (Chen, Pan and 
Xu, 2016; Malesky and Schuler, 2010). The same holds true for related conceptions of 
“consultative authoritarianism” (Truex, 2014) and “authoritarian deliberation” (He and 
Warren, 2011; Fishkin, et al., 2010). Here it is argued that autocracies consult their citizens 
and provide participation channels in order to increase the legitimacy of offices, regulations, 
and laws (Stromseth, Malesky, and Gueorguiev, 2017). It should also be noted that these 
debates about responsiveness, consultation, and deliberation in unlikely settings demonstrate 
that legitimacy does not need to remain on a macro-regime level. While Weber’s three types 
of legitimate rule have traditionally focused on the regime as a whole and a general narrative, 
newer research provide a micro-foundational perspective. These newer studies not only look 
at more concrete (and tangible) laws and regulations, but also break down their empirically 
driven, fine-grained analysis to local and regional levels. As such, we can observe a growing 
conceptual flexibility beyond the nation-state. Moreover, natural experiments have been used 
to  inquire into the influence of foreign media exposure on public support in autocracies  
(Kern and Hainmueller, 2009). Semi-structured interviews and online observatory 
participation has increased our understanding in how autocracies foster an ideological belief 
among its citizens (Dukalskis, 2017; Han, 2015). What these works unite is their innovative 
approach to studying how and to what extent autocracies try to legitimate their rule. This 
methodological creativity is needed in future research.   
Table 2: Methodological approaches to the study of legitimacy in autocracies 
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6. Conclusion: Why should we care studying legitimacy in autocracies?  
The question of legitimacy is a known unknown for autocracies. Autocratic leaders 
realize that it is important for them to know what people think, but they often lack the 
information to assess to what extent they are seen as legitimate. Folkloric tales of Oriental and 
Chinese emperors mingling with the people to learn what they think indicate that it has been a 
known unknown throughout history. Nazi Germany invested large sums and actually 
revolutionized survey research in order to ascertain what the people really think (Friedrich, 
1957, pp. 154–160). So, even the most brutish regime wants to know what its citizens believe. 
Today, we have case-based evidence on a range of countries with China and Russia at the 
forefront and among the most active in fostering a legitimacy belief (Gill, 2015; Holbig, 2013; 
Holbig and Gilley, 2010). 
The recent wave of scholarship on authoritarian politics becomes increasingly aware 
that these regimes try to legitimate their rule. As such, it has become a known unknown in 
academia as well. The whole innovative potential of social science methods needs to be 
harnessed in order to gradually learn more about this terrain. However, as Sartori has warned 
us some decades ago: “the progress of quantification should lag – in whatever discipline – 
behind its qualitative and conceptual progress” (Sartori, 1970, p. 1038). This conceptual essay 
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has been written in this Sartorian spirit and attempted to increase our understanding of 
legitimacy in an unlikely political setting. It has made use of the linguistic Ogden-Richards 
triangle to systematically discuss the concept. While it has offered a definition and a 
semantical map of rival concepts, it has argued that autocracies can indeed legitimate their 
rule, but do so on a more superficial level. They need to legitimate their rule with more 
neutral terms like efficiency, capacity, and performance, but remain by and large silent when 
justifying their right to rule in a deeper sense. Values of fairness, human rights, and voluntary 
consent are usually not in the arsenal of autocratic legitimacy claims. Instead, it can be 
hypothesized that autocracies need to sever the public discourse at this level. This is open to 
debate. What is not, however, is that the topic has become a major concern in the comparative 
study of authoritarianism.  
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